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Abstract	
An	 enduring	 puzzle	 in	 philosophy	 and	 developmental	 psychology	 is	 how	 young	
children	acquire	number	concepts,	in	particular	the	concept	of	natural	number.	Most	
solutions	to	this	problem	conceptualize	young	learners	as	lone	mathematicians	who	
individually	reconstruct	the	successor	function	and	other	sophisticated	mathematical	
ideas.	In	this	paper,	I	argue	for	a	crucial	role	of	testimony	in	children’s	acquisition	of	
number	 concepts,	 both	 in	 the	 transfer	 of	 propositional	 knowledge	 (e.g.,	 the	
cardinality	concept),	and	in	knowledge-how	(e.g.,	the	counting	routine).		
1.	The	puzzle	of	number	acquisition	
At	 around	 three-and-a-half	 to	 four	 years	 of	 age,	 children	 in	 western	 and	 other	
numerate	 cultures	experience	a	profound	 shift	 in	 their	understanding	of	numbers:	
they	 come	 to	 understand	 how	 counting	 works.	 They	 can	 use	 number	 words	 to	
denote	 the	 cardinality	 of	 collections	 of	 items	 in	 a	 precise	 fashion,	 by	 placing	 each	
item	to	be	counted	 into	a	one-to-one	correspondence	with	elements	of	a	counting	
list,	and	using	the	last	item	to	denote	the	cardinality	of	the	set	(see	e.g.,	Sarnecka	in	
press,	 Le	 Corre	 2014).	 Children’s	 acquisition	 of	 number	 concepts	 is	 often	
conceptualized	 in	 terms	 of	 individual	 discovery	 and	 personal	 reconstruction.	 For	
example,	 Carey	 (2009,	 302)	 writes	 that	 children	 learn	 to	 individuate	 three	 items	
“before	figuring	out	how	the	numeral	list	represents	natural	number”.	Davidson	et	al.	
(2012,	 163)	 put	 it	 this	 way,	 “sometime	 between	 the	 ages	 of	 3-and-a-half	 and	 4,	
children	discover	 that	counting	can	be	used	to	generate	sets	of	the	correct	size	for	
any	word	in	their	count	list”	(emphasis	added	in	both).		
While	 young	 children’s	 understanding	 of	 natural	 numbers	 is	 remarkable,	 it	 is	
misleading	 to	 suggest	 that	 each	 child	 figures	 this	 out	 individually.	 Young	 children	
grow	 up	 in	 an	 environment	 with	 numerate	 adults	 and	 older	 children,	 who	 use	
counting	 systems	 that	 are	 transmitted	 over	 many	 generations.	 Across	 cultures,	
humans	 use	 a	 variety	 of	 ways	 to	 count,	 including	 tallying,	 body-part	 counting,	
counting	rods,	and	abacuses.	Children	are	born	 in	these	rich	cultural	environments	
and	 adopt	 the	 counting	 systems	 of	 their	 parents,	 further	 extending	 them	 and	
building	 on	 them.	Our	 counting	 systems	 are	 in	 line	with	 other	 cultural	 inventions,	
where	 successive	 generations	 build	 on	 what	 earlier	 generations	 have	 already	
achieved.	Tomasello	et	al.	(2005,	688)	describe	this	process	of	learning	as	the	ratchet	
effect:	children	are	born	in	an	environment	of	collective	artifacts	(e.g.,	abacuses)	and	
social	practices	(e.g.,	body-part	counting),	which	structure	their	cognitive	ontogenies,	
and	allow	them	to	build	on	the	cultural	achievements	of	previous	generations.	 It	 is	
not	 clear	 when	 the	 earliest	 counting	 systems	 arose,	 but	 archaeological	 evidence	
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suggests	 that	 numeracy	 arose	 substantially	 earlier	 than	 writing.	 Bone,	 antlers,	 or	
ochre	 sticks	with	 regular	 incisions	 appear	 in	 the	 archaeological	 record	 from	 about	
77,000	years	ago,	but	 it	 is	unclear	whether	 these	notches	are	purely	decorative	or	
might	have	numerical	meaning	(Cain	2006).	From	about	25,000	years	ago,	artifacts	
appear	 that	have	 groupings	of	markings,	 indicating	 that	quantities	may	have	been	
meaningful.	Two	bones	from	Ishango,	Congo	(25,000	years	BP)	have	notches	that	are	
grouped	 in	 interesting	ways.	For	 instance,	one	of	 these	bones	has	 two	of	 its	 three	
sides	covered	with	notches	that	add	up	to	60	(Pletser	and	Huylebrouck	1990).	
In	 this	 paper,	 I	will	 argue	 that	 testimonial	 transmission	plays	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 how	
children	 learn	 about	 numbers.	 This	 involves	 both	 transmission	 of	 propositional	
knowledge	 (knowledge-that),	 and	 the	 transmission	 of	 skills	 (knowledge-how).	 The	
paper	 is	 structured	 as	 follows:	 In	 section	 2,	 I	 review	 children’s	 acquisition	 of	 the	
cardinal	 principle	 (CP).	 Section	 3	 describes	 how	 this	 cognitive	 change	 is	 usually	
framed	in	terms	of	individual	discovery.	This	view—which	I	term	the	child	as	a	lone	
mathematician—fits	 in	 a	 broader	 picture	 of	 children	 as	 individual	 learners	 and	
discoverers.	 Section	 4	 presents	 an	 alternative	 account	 of	 children’s	 learning,	 the	
child	 as	 a	 social	 learner	 who	 acquires	 knowledge	 through	 testimony.	 While	
traditionally	(particularly	in	philosophy),	testimonial	transmission	has	been	framed	in	
terms	 of	 propositional	 knowledge,	 I	 argue	 for	 a	 broader	 view	 where	 testimonial	
transmission	 also	 involves	 demonstration	 and	 transmission	 of	 knowledge-how.	 In	
section	5,	 I	outline	how	this	approach	 is	 fruitful	 in	explaining	how	children	acquire	
number	concepts.		
2.	Children’s	acquisition	of	the	cardinal	principle	
Children	typically	learn	to	count	through	a	stable	developmental	sequence.	Toddlers	
between	18	months	and	two	years	can	recite	counting	lists	(e.g.,	“one,	two,	three”)	
as	a	meaningless	string	of	words;	they	cannot	use	the	number	words	to	determine	
the	 cardinality	 of	 collections.	 At	 around	 two	 years	 of	 age,	 they	 become	 subset-
knowers	 (Wynn	1990).	 The	 first	 stage	 is	 to	 be	 a	 one-knower:	 a	 child	 can	 correctly	
give	 one	 item	when	 requested,	 e.g.,	 “Can	 you	 give	me	 one	 toy”,	 but	 performs	 at	
chance	 level	 for	 higher	 quantities	 (e.g.,	 the	 child	 gives	 three	 toys	 when	 two	 are	
requested).	The	next	 stage	 is	 to	become	a	 two-knower:	children	can	correctly	give	
one	or	 two	toys	but	perform	at	chance	 level	 for	 three	or	more;	 they	then	become	
three-knowers,	and	occasionally,	four-knowers—always	in	that	order.		
One	would	expect	 that	 the	next	 step	 is	becoming	a	 four-	or	 five-knower,	but	after	
three	 or	 four,	 a	 crucial	 cognitive	 change	 takes	 place.	 Children	 become	 cardinal	
principle	 (CP)	 knowers:	 they	 understand	 that	 counting	 can	 be	 used	 to	 denote	 the	
correct	cardinality	of	any	given	collection	of	items.	The	cardinal	principle	states	that	
if	 n	 is	 followed	 by	m	 in	 the	 counting	 sequence,	 a	 set	 with	 cardinality	 n	 will	 have	
cardinality	m	if	an	item	is	added.		While	this	seems	straightforward	(indeed,	we	use	
this	principle	without	conscious	reflection	when	we	count),	no	other	animal	seems	
to	understand	 it,	 in	 spite	of	 extensive	efforts	by	experimenters	 to	 train	 animals	 in	
numeracy.	For	example,	Ai,	a	female	chimpanzee,	learned	to	use	Arabic	digits	1	to	9	
to	denote	quantities,	but	had	to	 learn	each	separate	number	by	brute	association.	
She	did	not	make	the	shift	to	CP	at	the	numbers	4	or	5	(Biro	and	Matsuzawa	2001).		
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CP	builds	 on	phylogenetically	 older	 numerical	 abilities,	which	we	 share	with	many	
other	animals.	Even	insects,	such	as	honeybees,	can	recognize	small	quantities	up	to	
3	 or	 4	 precisely,	 a	 capacity	 that	 is	 termed	 ‘subitizing’	 (e.g.,	 Dacke	 and	 Srinivasan	
2008).	Humans	also	 subitize:	 they	are	more	 confident,	 less	 error-prone,	 and	much	
quicker	when	handling	small	sets	up	to	four	items,	compared	to	larger	sets	(Revkin	
et	al.	2008).	Human	newborns	can	distinguish	between	sets	up	to	3	or	4	items	(Antell	
and	 Keating	 1983).	 Numerical	 cognition	 for	 larger	 quantities	 is	 approximate:	 for	
instance,	we	can	see	that	putting	16	+	16	 together	 is	 smaller	 than	40,	but	without	
counting,	we	don’t	know	how	much	smaller	(Pica	et	al.	2004).	Young	chicks	(Rugani	
et	 al.	 2013)	 and	 guppies	 (Bisazza	 et	 al.	 2010)	 can	 estimate	 and	 compare	 different	
quantities,	such	as	four	versus	eight	without	any	prior	training.	However,	animals	are	
limited	 in	 their	 capacity	 to	 distinguish	 between	 numerosities	 larger	 than	 3	 or	 4	
exactly.	A	wide	range	of	studies	indicates	that	animals	can	distinguish	between	2	and	
3,	but	fail	to	tell	the	difference	between	5	and	6	(e.g.,	Petrazzini	et	al.	2015).	Animal	
numerical	 cognition	 above	 3	 or	 4	 is	 approximate,	 and	 becomes	 increasingly	 less	
precise	as	cardinalities	 increase	(see	e.g.,	Scarf	et	al.	2011,	for	a	comparative	study	
with	pigeons	and	primates).		
Since	 only	 humans	 are	 able	 to	 represent	 cardinalities	 above	 3	 or	 4	 precisely,	
cognitive	scientists	and	philosophers	have	speculated	how	children	acquire	number	
concepts.	Experimental	studies	on	children’s	numerical	cognition	suggest	that	it	is	a	
mixture	 of	 knowing-that	 (propositional	 knowledge)	 and	 knowing-how	 (procedural	
knowledge).	Examples	of	propositional	knowledge	are	knowing	that	numbers	can	be	
extended	indefinitely,	or	that	number	words	denote	precise	cardinalities	rather	than	
approximate	ones.	Already	before	they	are	able	to	count,	young	children	realize	that	
if	 you	add	 items	 to	a	 collection	of	 “five”,	 the	 resulting	cardinality	 cannot	be	“five”	
anymore,	and	that	“six	plus	more”	is	no	longer	“six”,	but	that	“a	lot	plus	more”	is	still	
“a	 lot”	 (Sarnecka	 and	 Gelman	 2004).	 As	 children	 grow	 older	 and	 have	 more	
experience	with	 formal	mathematics,	 they	 learn	 additional	 properties	 of	 numbers,	
such	as	 that	2	 is	prime,	or	 that	3	 is	both	prime	and	odd.	Knowledge-how	 involves	
elements	of	 the	counting	routine,	such	as	being	able	to	recite	number	words	 from	
memory	 in	 the	 correct	 order.	 It	 also	 involves	 the	 ability	 to	 keep	 track	 of	 what	 is	
already	 counted	when	 counting	 a	 collection	 of	 items.	 In	many	 cultures,	 numerical	
competence	 includes	 being	 able	 to	 use	 correct	 procedures,	 for	 instance,	 to	make	
calculations	 on	 an	 abacus	 or	 counting	 board,	 being	 able	 to	 carry	 numerals	 when	
multiplying,	 or	 using	 the	 correct	 procedure	 for	 a	 long	 division.	 Such	 skills	 require	
extensive	practice,	often	in	a	formal	school	context.			
3.	The	child	as	a	lone	mathematician	
How	 do	 we	 explain	 young	 children’s	 acquisition	 of	 knowledge	 about	 numbers,	 in	
particular	 the	 acquisition	 of	 CP?	 Standard	 accounts	 tend	 to	 conceptualize	 young	
children	 as	 lone	 mathematicians,	 who	 come	 up	 with	 the	 requisite	 concepts	
independently.	This	 is	 in	 line	with	the	popular	view	of	the	child	as	a	 little	scientist,	
introduced	by	the	developmental	psychologist	Piaget	(1929),	but	going	back	as	early	
as	 Rousseau	 (1762/1999).	 Piaget	 was	 impressed	 by	 how	 quickly	 children	 pick	 up	
information	about	their	environment,	and	he	was	intrigued	by	the	errors	they	made	
in	 the	 process.	 These	 errors	 suggested	 to	 him	 that	 children	 are	 not	 passive	
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receptacles	 of	 knowledge,	 but	 active	 learners.	 Children	 learn	 by	 actively	 engaging	
with	the	world,	and	changing	their	ideas	about	it	as	a	result	of	their	experience,	a	bit	
like	 scientists	who	conduct	experiments	and	 formulate	hypotheses	on	 the	basis	of	
them.	 This	 view	 has	 contemporary	 defenders,	 for	 example,	 Gopnik,	 Meltzoff	 and	
Kuhl	 (2001),	 who	 draw	 an	 explicit	 comparison	 between	 babies	 and	 scientists	
engaged	 in	 individual	 experimentation.	 Carey	 (2009,	 20)	 developes	 the	 analogy	
between	 scientists	 and	children	 further,	 conceptualizing	developmental	 changes	 in	
individual	children’s	minds	 in	terms	of	mini-scientific	revolutions,	with	processes	 in	
individual	minds	 being	 similar	 to	 “those	 described	 in	 the	 literature	 on	 history	 and	
philosophy	of	science”	(Carey	2009,	20).			
Carey	(2004,	2009)	regards	children’s	acquisition	of	the	CP	as	a	cognitive	revolution.	
She	 uses	 a	 Quinean	 bootstrapping	 account	 to	 explicate	 it.	 Bootstrapping	 is	 the	
process	whereby	a	child	acquires	a	new	concept	by	first	using	a	system	of	external	
symbols	 (counting	 words),	 initially	 without	 knowing	 what	 they	 mean.	 Through	
analogical	and	inductive	inference,	children	come	to	realize	what	the	symbols	stand	
for.	 First,	 children	 learn	 the	 counting	 list	 as	meaningless	 lexical	 items.	 During	 the	
next	phase,	they	realize	that	“one”	corresponds	to	one	item	in	a	collection	(e.g.,	one	
biscuit),	 and	 they	 do	 the	 same	with	 “two”	 and	 “three”.	 Children	 probably	 rely	 on	
their	subitizing	capacity	 to	associate	the	number	words	“one”,	“two”,	“three”	 (and	
sometimes	“four”)	with	the	corresponding	quantities.	However,	subitizing	ends	at	3	
or	4,	so	for	larger	quantities	this	system	does	not	work	anymore,	which	may	explain	
why	 children	become	one-knowers,	 two-knowers,	 three-knowers,	 and	occasionally	
four-knowers,	but	never	five-knowers.	According	to	the	bootstrapping	account,	it	is	
at	 this	 point	 that	 a	 crucial	 induction	 takes	 place:	 the	 child	 notices	 an	 analogy	
between	the	next	in	the	numeral	list	and	next	in	series	of	objects	to	be	counted.	She	
realizes	(for	small	numerosities	within	the	subitizing	range)	if	“x”	is	followed	by	“y”	in	
the	counting	sequence,	adding	an	individual	to	a	set	with	cardinal	value	x	results	in	a	
set	 with	 cardinal	 value	 y.	 She	 generalizes	 this	 for	 quantities	 >	 4.	 In	 this	 way,	 the	
successor	 function	 is	established.	The	successor	 function	plays	a	crucial	 role	 in	 the	
Dedekind–Peano	 axioms	 of	 arithmetic,	 a	 19th	 century	 formalization	 of	 arithmetic.	
The	 successor	 function	 is	 a	 primitive	 function,	 which	 takes	 that	 if	 a	 given	 n	 is	 a	
natural	number,	so	is	 its	successor,	 i.e.,	S(1)	=	2,	S(2)	=	3,	and	so	on.	The	successor	
function	 obeys	 several	 of	 the	 Dedekind-Peano	 axioms	 of	 arithmetic,	 for	 instance,	
that	the	successor	of	a	natural	number	is	also	a	natural	number,	and	that	there	is	no	
natural	number	whose	successor	 is	0.	 It	 is	remarkable,	given	that	this	function	was	
spelled	out	only	 in	 the	19th	 century,	 that	 three-	 and	 four-year-old	 children	around	
the	world	routinely	hit	upon	this	principle	through	induction.		
The	bootstrapping	account	is	not	without	controversy.	Rips	et	al.	(2006),	for	example,	
have	argued	that	 it	 is	 insufficient	to	explain	how	children	actually	 learn	the	natural	
numbers.	They	present	a	rather	contrived	case	of	three-year-old	twins	(Fran	and	Jan)	
to	 argue	 their	 case.	 Fran	 learns	 the	 standard	 natural	 numbers,	 while	 Jan	 learns	 a	
peculiar,	 modular	 system	 in	 which	 the	 count	 sequence	 cycles	 back	 around	 from	
‘‘nine’’	to	“none”,	and	then	goes	back	to	“one”,	“two”,	etc.,	again.	Clearly,	Jan	ends	
up	with	a	badly	underdetermined	system,	since	“two”	can	refer	to	collections	of	2,	
12,	 22,	 ...	 items.	Although	both	 children	have	used	 induction,	only	 Fran	 learns	 the	
natural	numbers.	Thus,	according	 to	Rips	et	al.	 (2006),	 induction	by	 itself	does	not	
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suffice	to	establish	natural	numbers.	Rips	et	al.	(2008)	instead	propose	that	children	
use	 abstract	 mathematical	 schemas,	 such	 as	 commutativity	 (a	 +	 b	 =	 b	 +	 a),	 to	
understand	 natural	 numbers.	 How	 do	 children	 learn	 such	 abstract	 schemas?	
According	to	Rips	et	al.,	 they	do	so	through	physical	experiences	and	manipulating	
the	environment:		
Suppose	 that	 children	 initially	notice	 that	 two	 similar	 sets	of	objects	–	
for	example,	two	sets	of	three	toy	cars	–	can	be	matched	one-to-one.	At	
a	later	stage,	they	may	extend	this	matching	to	successively	less	similar	
objects	–	three	toy	cars	matched	to	three	toy	drivers	–	and	eventually	to	
one-to-one	matching	 for	 any	 two	 sets	 of	 three	 items.	 This	 could	 yield	
the	general	concept	of	sets	that	can	be	matched	one-to-one	to	a	target	
set	 of	 three	 objects	 –	 a	 possible	 representation	 for	 three	 itself	 (Rips	
2008,	637).	
Again,	children	are	conceptualized	as	individual	discoverers	who	actively	experiment	
and	acquire	sophisticated	mathematical	knowledge	through	this.		
The	 picture	 of	 preschoolers	 who	 learn	 about	 numbers,	 including	 sophisticated	
concepts	 as	 the	 successor	 function	 and	 commutativity	 is	 that	 of	 the	 lone	
mathematician—akin	 to	 Srinivasa	 Ramanujan	 (1887-1920)	 who,	 seemingly	 on	 his	
own,	made	substantial	contributions	to	several	areas	of	mathematics.	The	tradition	
of	 the	 child	 as	 lone	 scientist/mathematician	 is	 not	 only	 descriptive,	 but	 also	
normative:	children	ought	to	learn	in	this	way.	Educators,	such	as	Maria	Montessori,	
have	devised	education	systems	that	encourage	children	to	learn	through	individual	
discovery.	The	idea	behind	this	is	that	individual	discovery	is	a	form	of	learning	that	
is	superior	to	social	 learning,	which	is	regarded	as	mere	parroting,	that	precludes	a	
genuine	understanding	of	what	is	being	learned.		
4.	Learning	through	testimony	
An	alternative	developmental	picture	sees	young	children	primarily	as	social	learners,	
who	benefit	 from	the	vast	knowledge	and	experience	of	adults	and	older	children.	
This	 tradition	goes	back	 to	Thomas	Reid	 (1764)	who	regarded	 testimony	as	one	of	
the	most	 important	 channels	 through	which	we	 learn;	 like	perception	or	memory,	
testimony	 is	 a	 basic	 source	 of	 knowledge.	 Although	 we	 may	 occasionally	 be	 led	
astray	 by	 liars	 or	 people	 who	 are	 genuinely	 mistaken,	 testimony	 is	 an	 important	
source	 of	 information	 for	 facts	 outside	 of	 our	 immediate	 experience.	 Indeed,	
without	 testimony,	we	would	not	even	know	the	place	and	date	of	our	own	birth.	
Reid	 (1764)	 formulated	several	arguments	 for	why	 testimony	 is	a	crucial	and	basic	
source	of	knowledge:	humans	have	a	natural	 inclination	to	believe	what	they	learn	
from	others,	and	they	only	become	sceptical	when	they	have	reasons	to	be	doubtful	
(e.g.,	 the	 testifier	 is	 a	 known	 liar).	 Young	 children	 are	 more	 gullible	 than	 adults,	
showing	that	it	is	an	innate	tendency.	As	he	wrote:		
It	 is	 evident,	 that	 in	 the	 matter	 of	 testimony,	 the	 balance	 of	 human	
judgment	 is	 by	 nature	 inclined	 to	 the	 side	 of	 belief;	 and	 turns	 to	 that	
side	 of	 itself	 when	 there	 is	 nothing	 put	 in	 the	 opposite	 scale.	 ...	 if	
credulity	were	the	effect	of	reasoning	and	experience,	 it	must	grow	up	
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and	gather	strength,	 in	 the	same	proportion	as	 reason	and	experience	
do.	But	 if	 it	 is	 the	 gift	 of	 nature,	 it	will	 be	 strongest	 in	 childhood,	 and	
limited	and	 restrained	by	experience;	and	 the	most	 superficial	 view	of	
human	life	shows,	that	the	last	is	really	the	case,	and	not	the	first	(Reid	
1764,	478–479).		
Reid’s	account	of	testimony	is	both	descriptive	and	normative:	humans	acquire	vast	
stores	of	knowledge	through	testimony,	and	it	 is	proper	to	do	so.	For	testimony	to	
work,	 two	 elements	 need	 to	 be	 in	 place:	 trustfulness	 and	 truthfulness,	 or	 as	 Reid	
calls	 them,	 the	 principle	 of	 credulity	 and	 the	 principle	 of	 veracity,	 “two	 principles	
that	 tally	 with	 each	 other”	 (Reid	 1764,	 474).	 Children	 need	 to	 be	 willing	 to	 learn	
counterintuitive,	strange	 ideas,	such	as	 that	 the	Earth	 is	 round	even	though	 it	 is	 in	
their	 own	 experience	 flat,	 if	 they	 want	 to	 learn	 the	 correct	 scientific	 view	 of	 the	
Earth.	 Parents	 and	 teachers	 must	 be	 “benevolent	 communicators”	 (Csibra	 and	
Gergely	 2009,	 152),	 who	 are	 willing	 to	 teach	 and	 not	 to	 deceive.	 The	 strange	
scenario	Rips	et	al.	(2006)	offer	of	one	of	the	twins	being	taught	a	modular	counting	
method	(by	a	“diabolic	parent”,	as	they	put	it)	is	unlikely	to	occur	in	real	life.		
This	 Reidian	 picture	 of	 children	 as	 trustful	 social	 learners	 is	 gaining	 increasing	
popularity	in	cognitive	science	(see	e.g.,	Harris	2012,	for	a	comprehensive	overview).	
Csibra	 and	 Gergely	 (2009)	 have	 argued	 that	 humans	 are	 natural	 pedagogues,	 and	
that	 communication	 has	 evolved	 to	 facilitate	 the	 transmission	 of	 knowledge.	
Applying	this	model	of	the	child	as	social	learner	to	numerical	cognition,	we	come	to	
the	 view	 of	 children	 as	 socially-embedded	 mathematicians.	 Likening	 children	 to	
grown-up	 scientists	 or	 mathematicians	 is	 inherently	 problematic;	 for	 one	 thing,	
children	 do	 not	 really	 conduct	 experiments.	 However,	 even	 if	 one	 were	 to	 insist	
upon	such	a	close	analogy,	it	is	important	to	point	out	that	mathematicians	rely	on	
testimony	 and	 other	 forms	 of	 socially	 transmitted	 information.	 Thurston	 (2006)	
observes	
Mathematical	 knowledge	 can	 be	 transmitted	 amazingly	 fast	within	 a	
subfield.	 When	 a	 significant	 theorem	 is	 proved,	 it	 often	 (but	 not	
always)	happens	that	the	solution	can	be	communicated	in	a	matter	of	
minutes	 from	 one	 person	 to	 another	 within	 the	 subfield.	 The	 same	
proof	would	 be	 communicated	 and	 generally	 understood	 in	 an	 hour	
talk	 to	 members	 of	 the	 subfield	 ...	 When	 people	 are	 doing	
mathematics,	 the	 flow	 of	 ideas	 and	 the	 social	 standard	 of	 validity	 is	
much	 more	 reliable	 than	 formal	 documents.	 People	 are	 usually	 not	
very	good	in	checking	formal	correctness	of	proofs,	but	they	are	quite	
good	at	detecting	potential	weaknesses	or	 flaws	 in	proofs	 (Thurston,	
2006,	43,	46).	
Geist	et	al.	(2010)	argue	that	mathematicians	frequently	rely	on	testimony	to	decide	
matters	such	as	the	soundness	of	a	mathematical	proof.	For	 instance,	many	proofs	
rely	 on	 theorems	 that	 have	 been	 proved	 before,	 and	 individual	 mathematicians	
using	 these	 theorems	 do	 not	 meticulously	 check	 for	 themselves	 whether	 these	
earlier	proofs	are	correct.	Moreover,	reviewers	for	papers	for	mathematical	journals	
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do	not	check	all	proofs	in	detail	for	themselves,	but	rely	on	the	author’s	own	scrutiny,	
only	checking	results	in	detail	when	it	seems	warranted	to	do	so.			
Given	 that	 children’s	 early	 knowledge	 of	 numerical	 concepts	 is	 largely	 procedural	
(correctly	 using	 the	 counting	 routine	 to	 denote	 cardinalities	 of	 sets),	 one	may	 ask	
whether	 testimony	 is	a	good	model	 for	 the	acquisition	of	number	concepts.	When	
we	think	of	testimony,	we	tend	to	think	of	propositional	knowledge.	Indeed,	Poston	
(2016)	argues	that	knowing-how	is	not	transmitted	as	easily	as	knowing-that.	When	I	
tell	 my	 daughter	 that	 Jimi	 Hendrix	 was	 a	 famous	 guitarist,	 she	 thereby	 comes	 to	
know	that	Hendrix	was	a	famous	guitarist.	However,	when	someone	demonstrates	a	
guitar	riff	from	Hendrix’	repertoire	to	her,	she	thereby	does	not	come	to	know	that	
riff.	 It	would	likely	take	her	many	weeks	to	learn	the	riff,	and	if	her	guitar	skills	are	
not	 up	 to	 it,	 she	 may	 never	 learn	 how	 to	 perform	 it	 correctly.	 We	 can	 through	
testimony	 learn	 fairly	 complex	 pieces	 of	 propositional	 knowledge,	which	 does	 not	
seem	to	be	the	case	for	knowledge-how.	This	disanalogy	between	the	transmission	
of	knowing-that	(which	you	can	do	by	simply	stating	that	p)	and	knowing-how	(which	
you	 cannot	 do	 by	 simply	 demonstrating	 φ)	 leads	 Poston	 (2016)	 to	 conclude	 that	
knowing-how	is	not	reducible	to	knowing-that.		
While	Poston	(2016)	is	correct	that	learning	a	skill	requires	additional	resources	from	
the	 learner	 (e.g.,	 practice),	 there	are	nonetheless	 striking	parallels	between	verbal	
testimony	 and	 demonstration	 of	 knowing-how.	 Buckwalter	 and	 Turri	 (2014)	 argue	
that	 demonstration	 has	 a	 close	 analogue	 to	 the	 knowledge	 norm	 of	 assertion.	
According	to	the	knowledge	norm	of	assertion,	when	you	assert	that	p	 	you	should	
know	that	p	(Williamson	2000).	There	are	several	motivations	for	this,	e.g.,	it	would	
be	paradoxical	to	say:	p,	but	I	don’t	know	that	p,	and	people	will	often	challenge	an	
assertor	 by	 asking,	 “How	 do	 you	 know	 that?”	 Similarly,	 in	 showing	 a	 skill	
(demonstration),	 you	 need	 to	 know	 how	 to	 perform	 that	 skill.	 It	 would	 be	
paradoxical	to	say,	“I	will	show	you	how	to	φ,	but	I	don’t	know	how	to	φ”.	You	can	
also	 challenge	 a	demonstrator,	 e.g.,	 one	 can	 ask	 a	bungling	 ski	 instructor	 “Do	 you	
actually	know	how	to	ski?”		
If	 we	 look	 at	 testimony	 in	 the	 broader	 context	 of	 social	 learning,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	
demonstrating	skills	preceded	verbal	testimony,	perhaps	by	over	one	million	years.	
Evidence	 for	 explicit	 teaching	 and	 demonstration	 appears	 as	 early	 as	 2.5	 million	
years	ago.	Early	human	stone	tool	technology,	such	as	Oldowan	(ca.	2.5	million	years	
ago)	and	Acheulean	(ca.	1.5	million	years	ago),	require	some	form	of	social	learning	
that	almost	certainly	 involved	demonstration,	and	very	 likely	also	explicit	 teaching,	
e.g.,	how	to	correctly	strike	the	core	(demonstrating	the	angle	with	which	you	have	
to	hit	the	core	so	as	to	obtain	a	razor-sharp	flake	that	can	be	used	to	cut	meat),	or	
which	pebbles	 to	 flake	 from.	Demonstration	and	 trusting	demonstration	may	be	a	
uniquely	human	capacity.	While	chimpanzees	are	sophisticated	social	learners,	they	
do	 not	 faithfully	 follow	 demonstrators.	 For	 example,	 Horner	 and	 Whiten	 (2005)	
showed	children	and	 juvenile	chimpanzees	a	complex	way	 to	open	a	puzzle	box	 in	
order	to	retrieve	a	candy.	Both	chimps	and	children	opened	the	box	in	the	way	that	
was	demonstrated.	However,	in	a	second	try,	a	transparent	box	was	used	that	made	
it	 obvious	 that	part	 of	 the	 actions	were	 superfluous.	 The	 children	 continued	using	
the	 way	 that	 was	 demonstrated	 to	 them	 (this	 tendency	 of	 sticking	 to	 a	 learned	
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suboptimal	routine	is	called	overimitation).	The	chimpanzees	went	for	a	more	direct	
way	to	obtain	the	candy	that	deviated	from	the	demonstration.	The	human	default	
position	 is	 one	 of	 trust.	 Children	 show	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 trust	 when	 an	 adult	
demonstrates	them	the	“proper	way”	to	do	something:	they	assume,	by	default,	that	
demonstration	presupposes	knowing-how.	Overimitation	has	not	only	been	found	in	
western	children	 (who	might	be	 influenced	by	schooling),	but	also	 in	children	who	
live	 in	 groups	with	 little	 formal	 education,	 such	 as	 in	 South-African	 and	Australian	
hunter-gatherer	societies	(Nielsen	et	al.	2014).		
Humans	are	the	only	species	that	have	cumulative	cultural	transmission	in	a	variety	
of	 domains:	 they	 build	 on	 the	 accomplishments	 of	 earlier	 generations	 and	 create	
more	complex	cultural	elements,	including	artifacts	(e.g.,	the	atl	atl,	a	small	artifact	
that	attaches	to	a	spear	to	make	it	go	much	further	and	faster	when	thrown),	ways	
of	 preparing	 food	 (to	 make	 it	 less	 toxic,	 tastier,	 or	 easier	 to	 digest),	 and	 stories	
(including	 very	 long	 and	 complex	 epic	 tales).	 Cumulative	 culture	 is	 not	 altogether	
absent	 in	 nonhuman	 animals.	 For	 example,	 New	 Caledonian	 crows	 (Corvus	
moneduloides)	which	use	tools	made	of	the	edges	of	Pandanus	leaves	to	help	them	
catch	 invertebrates,	 use	 design	 innovations	 by	 conspecifics	 to	 improve	 their	 own	
tools	 (Hunt	 and	 Gray	 2003).	 However,	 their	 cumulative	 culture	 is	 limited	 to	 the	
domain	 of	 tools.	 By	 contrast,	 human	 learning	 takes	 place	 in	 an	 environment	
populated	 with	 potential	 teachers	 and	 artifacts,	 and	 concerns	 a	 wide	 range	 of	
domains.	According	 to	Sterelny’s	 (2012)	apprenticeship	model,	humans	grow	up	 in	
environments	that	are	“seeded”	with	artifacts	that	help	and	support	learning	novel	
skills	and	information.	Children	learn	by	combining	information	from	the	social	world	
with	information	from	the	physical	world.	For	example,	in	a	workshop,	tools	tend	to	
be	 laid	out	 in	an	order	 that	 facilitates	completing	specific	 tasks,	 such	as	making	or	
repairing	furniture.	Through	observing	accomplished	woodworkers	or	through	active	
teaching,	or	likely	a	combination	of	both,	young	apprentices	learn	both	the	requisite	
propositional	 knowledge	 (e.g.,	 distinguishing	 between	 the	 top	 rail,	 splat,	 and	 back	
rail	of	a	chair)	and	knowledge-how	(e.g.,	how	to	use	a	hole-saw	properly).	In	this	way,	
the	 testimonial	 transmission	 of	many	 complex	 domains	 of	 culture	 requires	 both	 a	
transmission	 of	 propositional	 knowledge,	 and	 a	 transmission	 of	 skills	 through	
demonstration.		
5.	The	testimonial	transmission	of	number	concepts	
We	are	now	 in	a	position	 to	examine	how	the	 testimonial	 transmission	of	number	
concepts	might	work.	When	children	learn	to	count	at	about	3.5-4	years	of	age,	they	
do	not	yet	have	a	fully-fledged	concept	of	natural	numbers.	For	example,	children	of	
this	age	tend	to	fail	the	Piagetian	conservation	task	(Piaget	1941):	when	one	lays	out	
a	 row	 of	 items,	 they	 tend	 to	 think	 that	 its	 number	 changes	 if	 the	 spatial	
configuration	 of	 the	 row	 changes	 (e.g.,	 by	widening	 the	 gaps	 between	 the	 items).	
Although	Piaget’s	theoretical	rationale	for	why	young	children	fail	this	task,	and	only	
succeed	 in	 it	 about	 age	 5-7	 is	 no	 longer	 generally	 accepted,	 failure	 of	 toddlers	 to	
pass	 the	 conservation	 task	 is	 robust	 and	 has	 often	 been	 replicated.	 Young	 CP-
knowers	do	not	realize	that	number	words	further	in	the	counting	list	are	larger	than	
numbers	 earlier	 in	 the	 counting	 list	 (the	 later-greater	 principle),	 even	 though	 it	
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seems	 like	 this	 could	 be	 easily	 inferred	 from	 the	 CP	 and	 its	 applications	 (Le	 Corre	
2014).	
Moving	 to	more	 sophisticated	 concepts,	 the	development	of	 children’s	 concept	 of	
zero	follows	a	different	trajectory	compared	to	other	natural	numbers.	 It	seems	to	
proceed	 in	 three	 phases	 (Wellman	 and	 Miller	 1986).	 In	 the	 earliest	 phase,	
preschoolers	recognize	the	Arabic	numeral	0	and	the	noun	“zero”,	but	they	do	not	
know	 what	 it	 means.	 In	 the	 second	 phase,	 children	 understand	 zero	 to	 refer	 to	
nothing,	 but	 they	do	not	understand	 its	 relationship	 to	other	 small	 numbers	 (e.g.,	
they	 are	 equally	 likely	 to	 say	 that	 0	 is	 smaller	 than	 3	 or	 vice	 versa,	whereas	 they	
understand	that	1	is	smaller	than	3).	The	third	phase	is	when	children	realize	zero	is	
the	 smallest	 natural	 number,	 and	 they	 can	 make	 accurate	 comparisons	 between	
zero	and	other	small	numbers.		
Children’s	 understanding	 of	 infinity	 also	 appears	 several	 years	 after	 they	 learn	 to	
count.	 Many	 counting	 systems,	 be	 they	 number	 words	 or	 other	 ways	 to	 denote	
numbers	 (e.g.,	 pointing	 to	 body	parts,	where	 each	body	part	 symbolizes	 a	 natural	
number)	are	quite	 limited,	often	not	exceeding	20	or	30.	 In	 these	cultures,	people	
can	come	up	with	higher	numbers	on	an	ad	hoc	basis	(e.g.,	counting	fingers	and	toes	
of	several	people	present).	Children’s	understanding	of	infinity	only	arises	at	about	8	
years	of	age,	many	years	after	their	ability	to	count	collections	has	developed.	Eight-
year-olds	have	some	understanding	of	potential	and	actual	infinity,	but	they	still	do	
not	 appreciate	 that	 an	 infinite	 set	 is	 immeasurably	 bigger	 than	 a	 finite	 set	 (for	
example,	they	mistakenly	think	that	a	very	large	set,	such	as	the	number	of	grains	of	
sand	 on	 a	 beach,	 is	 almost	 infinite)—indeed,	 even	 many	 numerate	 adults	 fail	 to	
grasp	this	unbridgeable	gap	between	very	large	sets	and	infinite	sets	(Falk	2010).	It	is	
worth	pointing	out	that	the	concepts	of	zero	and	infinity	are	lacking	in	many	cultures	
that	 use	 natural	 numbers	 (e.g.,	 Roman	 numerals	 do	 not	 have	 a	 symbol	 for	 zero).	
Thus,	knowledge	of	numbers	is	not	all-or-nothing.	It	has	many	components,	such	as	
understanding	 how	 counting	 works,	 what	 cardinalities	 are,	 how	 to	 perform	
calculations,	 as	well	 as	more	 complex,	 culturally	 restricted	 concepts,	 such	 as	 zero	
and	infinity.		
How	do	children	 learn	about	natural	numbers	 in	a	social	context?	Children	tend	to	
grow	up	 in	 environments	 that	 are	 seeded	with	 artifacts	 and	 ideas	 that	 help	 them	
acquire	 number	 concepts.	 These	 include	 not	 only	 special	 learning	 tools,	 such	 as	
abacuses	 for	 children,	 or	 foam	 numbers	 for	 the	 bathtub,	 but	 also	 the	 symbolic	
representations	 of	 numbers	 that	 adults	 use	 in	 their	 day-to-day	 lives.	 In	 this	
environment,	 children	 acquire	 knowledge	of	 numbers	 through	 their	 parents,	 older	
siblings,	and	more	formal	learning	situations	(e.g.,	preschool	and	elementary	school).		
Learning	 the	counting	 list	by	 rote	memory	 is	a	crucial	 step	 towards	 learning	about	
natural	numbers.	Counting	 is	ostensive	and	deliberate:	across	 the	world,	 there	are	
counting	songs	and	routines	to	help	children	memorize	the	first	few	counting	words.	
In	English,	this	is	usually	the	first	five	(Five	little	monkeys,	Five	little	ducks)	or	the	first	
ten	 counting	 words	 (Ten	 in	 a	 bed,	 This	 old	 man).	 During	 these	 early	 encounters,	
children	 do	 not	 yet	 grasp	 the	 semantic	 content	 of	 these	 number	 words,	 but	 the	
songs	 do	 help	 them	 familiarize	 themselves	 with	 counting	 routines.	 Interestingly,	
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such	 counting	 routines	 and	 songs	 are	 absent	 in	 languages	 without	 exact	 number	
words,	and	in	homesigners	(deaf	children	and	adults	who	live	with	hearing	parents	
and	carers,	without	using	a	fully-developed	sign	language)	(Spaepen	et	al.	2011).		
Levine	et	al.	(2010)	recorded	7.5	hours	of	natural	conversations	(in	several	sessions)	
between	 parents	 and	 toddlers	 aged	 14	 to	 30	 months	 to	 understand	 how	 talking	
about	 numbers	 (“number	 talk”)	 influences	 numerical	 cognition.	 Parents	 were	
informed	that	this	was	a	study	on	language	development,	but	they	did	not	learn	that	
it	 was	 specifically	 about	 number	words,	 so	 as	 to	 not	 influence	 them	 to	 use	more	
number	words	than	they	would	do	under	ordinary	circumstances.	The	authors	found	
that	 parents	 used	 an	 average	of	 90.8	number	words	over	 the	7.5	hours	 recorded.	
Remarkably,	 only	 an	 average	 of	 6.3	 instances	 of	 this	 number	 talk	 consisted	 of	
prompts	where	 children	 had	 to	 give	 cardinal	 values,	 e.g.,	 “how	many	 cars	 do	 you	
see?”	Most	of	the	time,	number	talk	was	testimonial.	About	50%	of	number	talk	by	
parents	 consisted	 of	 stating	 cardinal	 values	 (“Look,	 three	 fish!”);	 32%	 consisted	 of	
counting	 songs,	 rhymes	 and	 routines.	When	 the	 toddlers	 engaged	 in	 number	 talk,	
about	 62%	 consisted	 of	 counting	 routines,	 and	 28%	 of	 cardinal	 values.	 These	
utterances	 demonstrate	 the	 importance	 of	 transmitting	 knowing-how	 to	 count	 in	
children’s	early	acquisition	of	number	concepts.	Both	the	toddlers	and	their	parents	
included	 counting	 routines	 in	 their	 number	 talk.	 Levine	 et	 al.	 (2010)	 found	 that	
children	 whose	 parents	 engaged	 more	 in	 number	 talk	 performed	 better	 at	 a	
cardinality	 test	 at	 46	months.	 Given	 that	 high	 socioeconomic	 status	 (SES)	 parents	
tend	to	talk	more	to	their	children,	they	controlled	for	the	amount	of	talking	and	for	
SES.	They	 found	 that	parents	who	 talked	more	about	number,	 taking	 into	account	
SES,	had	children	with	more	knowledge	of	the	cardinal	meanings	of	number	words	at	
46	months.		
Number	 talk	 not	 only	 helps	 children	 to	master	 the	 counting	 routine,	 it	 also	 helps	
them	to	become	aware	of	the	fact	that	number	words	and	symbols	refer	to	discrete	
quantities.	This	has	been	demonstrated	 in	 the	blocks	and	water	 task	 (Slusser	et	al.	
2013),	 where	 young	 children	 are	 presented	 with	 two	 bowls,	 one	 containing	
countable	 items	 (blocks	of	 different	 colors)	 and	another	 containing	 colored	water.	
The	experimenter	asks	the	toddlers	either	a	number	question	“Which	one	has	five?”	
or	a	question	that	does	not	involve	numbers	(“Which	one	has	orange?”)	N-knowers,	
who	can	only	enumerate	collections	up	to	three	or	four,	do	well	within	their	range	
but	 perform	 less	 consistently	 at	 higher	 numbers	 (five,	 six).	 However,	 when	
experimenters	 start	 with	 small	 numbers	 and	 work	 their	 way	 up,	 these	 younger	
children	 tend	 to	 choose	 the	 bowl	 with	 the	 blocks	 when	 asked	 “Which	 one	 has	
five/six”,	 indicating	 they	have	 some	understanding	 that	 these	 cardinalities	 refer	 to	
discrete	entities,	not	to	uncountable	quantities.	Number	talk,	where	parents,	other	
carers,	 and	 older	 siblings	 refer	 to	 discrete	 sets,	 may	 help	 young	 children	 to	
understand	this	property	of	number	words.		
Next	 to	 linguistic	 input,	 artifacts	 can	 help	 support	 children’s	 developing	 numerical	
cognition.	Board	games,	such	as	the	Game	of	Goose,	which	often	involve	numerical	
properties	(e.g.,	throwing	a	die	that	shows	n	requires	the	child	to	move	her	piece	n	
spaces	 forward),	 have	 a	 positive	 impact	 on	 children’s	 later	 mathematical	
achievements.	 As	 Siegler	 and	 Booth	 (2004,	 441)	 point	 out,	 this	 may	 be	 because	
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“Board	 games	 provide	 children	 with	 strongly	 correlated	 spatial,	 temporal,	
kinaesthetic,	 and	 verbal	 or	 auditory	 cues	 to	 numerical	 magnitude.”	 Siegler	 and	
Ramani	 (2009)	 found	 that	 especially	 designed	 games	 that	were	 linear,	 rather	 than	
having	 numbers	 in	 a	 spiraling	 or	 circular	 pattern,	 were	 particularly	 effective	 in	
helping	young	children	 from	 low	SES	backgrounds	 to	 close	 the	numeracy	gap	with	
their	 high	 SES	 peers.	 Under	 the	 apprenticeship	 model	 of	 human	 learning,	 the	
environment	 is	 seeded	 with	 artifacts	 that	 help	 to	 support	 the	 development	 of	
numeracy.	 However,	 the	 lack	 of	 knowledge	 of	 natural	 numbers	 in	 homesigners	
indicates	that	an	environment	seeded	with	cues	for	numbers	is	not	sufficient.	There	
needs	 to	 be	 active	 testimonial	 transmission	 as	 well,	 which	 is	 lacking	 in	 these	
transmission	 situations	 where	 there	 is	 no	 adequate	 sign	 language	 to	 transmit	
number	concepts.		
If	 the	 acquisition	 of	 number	 concepts	 is	 the	 result	 of	 testimony	 to	 skills	 and	
propositional	 knowledge,	 we	 can	 understand	 why	 not	 all	 human	 cultures	 have	
natural	numbers.	Some	cultures,	such	as	the	Pirahã	(e.g.,	Frank	et	al.	2008)	and	the	
Mundurucú	 (e.g.,	 Pica	 et	 al.	 2004),	 lack	 words	 to	 denote	 exact	 cardinalities.	 In	 a	
video1	recorded	by	anthropologist	Pierre	Pica,	an	old	man	and	the	medicine	man	of	a	
Mundurucú	village	attempt	to	count	10	and	13	seeds,	with	limited	success.	As	can	be	
seen,	 the	men	are	not	used	 to	 count,	 e.g.,	 they	do	not	 separate	what	has	already	
been	 counted	 and	 what	 still	 has	 to	 be	 counted,	 something	 young	 children	 in	
numerate	 cultures	 learn	 early	 on.	 Mundurucú	 do	 not	 have	 counting	 routines,	
although,	 intriguingly,	 their	 language	 does	 have	 a	 count/mass	 noun	 distinction,	
indicating	they	see	the	difference	between	discrete	and	continuous	quantities	(Pica	
and	Lecomte	2008).	While	this	distinction	is	vital	for	children	to	understand	natural	
numbers,	it	is	clearly	not	enough	to	help	them	count.		
The	testimonial	model	of	knowledge	transmission	can	also	explain	why	non-human	
animals	 fail	 to	 understand	 CP.	 Learning	 CP,	 as	 we	 have	 seen,	 depends	 on	 an	
understanding	 of	 the	 counting	 routine.	 Children	 learn	 the	 counting	 routine	 when	
they	are	 young	 toddlers,	 far	 too	early	 to	grasp	 its	meaning.	Humans	are	willing	 to	
copy	actions	even	if	they	do	not	understand	them,	which	helps	them	to	acquire	the	
correct	sequence	of	counting	words.	This	is	a	big	difference	with	the	chimpanzee	Ai	
who	was	taught	to	use	Arabic	digits	 in	Biro	and	Matsuzawa’s	(2001)	studies.	Ai	did	
not	 learn	 the	 counting	 routine,	 instead	 relying	 on	 estimation	 to	 enumerate	
collections	 of	 items	 and	 assigning	 them	 to	 the	 correct	 numeral.	 As	 Biro	 and	
Matsuzawa	 (2001)	observe,	while	Ai	may	have	been	 similar	 to	 children	 in	 the	 fact	
that	 she	 learned	 symbols	 for	 numbers,	 this	 is	 just	 one	 aspect	 of	 learning	 how	 to	
count.	 She	was	 not	 raised	 in	 a	 supportive,	 rich	 environment	 filled	with	 numerical	
cues.			
6.	Conclusions	
The	question	of	how	children	 learn	number	concepts	 is	unresolved.	 In	this	paper,	 I	
have	argued	that	 testimony	plays	an	 important	role	 in	 the	transmission	of	number	
concepts',	both	to	knowing-how	(the	skills	involved	in	counting)	and	to	knowing-that																																																									1	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9iXh8wte3gM	
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(propositional	 knowledge	about	number	words,	 such	as	 that	 they	 refer	 to	discrete	
quantities).	Children	grow	up	 in	a	world	seeded	with	artifacts,	counting	songs,	and	
other	cultural	features	that	help	them	to	count.	I	have	pointed	out	the	shortcomings	
of	 the	 model	 of	 children	 as	 lone	 mathematicians,	 who	 discover	 sophisticated	
mathematical	principles	by	themselves.	In	order	to	understand	numerical	cognition,	
we	should	not	only	pay	attention	to	what	may	go	on	in	the	minds	of	young	children,	
but	also	to	what	goes	on	in	their	broader	learning	environment.		
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